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Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated
strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These
patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and
the sel®sh motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the
altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanationof cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals
punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation ¯ourishes if altruistic
punishmentispossible,andbreaksdownifitisruledout.Theevidenceindicatesthatnegativeemotionstowardsdefectorsarethe
proximatemechanismbehindaltruisticpunishment.Theseresultssuggestthatfuturestudyoftheevolutionofhumancooperation
should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
Throughout evolution, crucial human activities like hunting big
game, sharing meat, conserving common property resources, and
warfare constituted a public good. In situations like these, every
member of the group bene®ts from the `good', including those
who did not pay any costs of providing the good. This raises the
question of why people regularly participate in costly cooperative
activitieslikewarfareandbig-gamehunting
1±4.Severaltheorieshave
been proposed to explain the evolution of human cooperation. The
theory of kin selection
5 focuses on cooperation among individuals
that are genetically closely related, whereas theories of direct
reciprocity
6±9 focus on the sel®sh incentives for cooperation in
bilateral long-term interactions. The theories of indirect reciproc-
ity
10±15 and costly signalling
16±18 show how cooperation in larger
groupscanemergewhenthecooperators canbuildareputation.Yet
these theories do not readily explain why cooperation is frequent
among genetically unrelated people, in non-repeated interactions,
when gains from reputation are small or absent.
Punishmentprovidesasolutiontothisproblem.Ifthosewhofree
ride on the cooperation of others are punished, cooperation may
pay
3,19±23. Yet this `solution' begs the question of who will bear the
cost of punishing the free riders. Everybody in the group will be
better off if free riding is deterred, but nobody has an incentive to
punish the free riders. Thus, the punishment of free riders con-
stitutes a second-order public good. The problem of second-order
public goods can be solved if enough humans have a tendency for
altruistic punishment, that is, if they are motivated to punish free
riders even though it is costly and yields no material bene®ts for the
punishers.
Weexaminedthequestionofwhetherhumansengageinaltruistic
punishment and how this inclination affects the ability of achieving
andsustainingcooperation. Atotalof240studentsparticipatedina
`public goods' experiment with real monetary stakes and two
treatment conditions: punishment and no punishment. In both
conditions, groups with four members played the following public
goods game. Each member received an endowment of 20 money
units (MUs) and each one could contribute between 0 and 20 MUs
to a group project. Subjects could keep the money that they did not
contributetotheproject.Forevery MUinvestedintheproject,each
of the four group members, that is, also those who invested little or
nothing, earned 0.4MUs. Thus, the investor's return from investing
one additional MU in the project was 0.4MUs, whereas the group
return was 1.6MUs. Because the cost of investing 1MU in the
project was exactly 1MU, whereas the private return was only
0.4MUs, it was always in the material self-interest of any subject
tokeepallMUsprivatelyÐirrespectiveofhowmuchtheotherthree
subjects contributed. Yet, if all group members kept all MUs
privately, each subject earned only 20MUs, whereas if all of them
invested their 20MUs each subject would earn 0.4 ´ 80 = 32MUs.
All the interactions in the experiment took place anonymously.
Members were not informed of the identity of the others in the
group. Subjects made their investment decisions simultaneously
and, once the decisions were made, they were informed about the
investments of the other group members. The only difference
between the two conditions was that in the punishment condition,
subjects could punish each of the other group members after they
were informed about the others' investments. A punishment deci-
sion was implemented by assigning between 0 and 10 points to the
punished member. Each point assigned cost the punished member
3MUs and the punishing member 1MU. All the punishment
decisions were also made simultaneously.
Because we conjectured that the opportunity for punishing
would have a larger impact if subjects could learn about the
behaviour of other group members, we repeated the basic public
goods gameÐwith and without punishment opportunity, depend-
ing on the treatmentÐfor six periods. To rule out that repetition
created cooperation or punishment through direct reciprocity
6±9or
reputation
10±15, the group composition changed from period to
period such that no subject ever met another subject more than
once. Moreover, our design ruled out any kind of reputation
formation (see Methods), so purely sel®sh subjects will never
cooperate or punish others, because cooperation and punishment
are costly and yield no pecuniary bene®ts. Therefore, the sel®sh
motives associated with theories of indirect reciprocity
10±15 orcostly
signalling
16±18 cannot explain cooperation and punishment in this
environment.
However, punishment may well bene®t the future group mem-
bers of a punished subject, if that subject responds to the punish-
ment by raising investments in the following periods. In this sense,
punishmentisaltruistic.Inthepresenceofaltruisticpunishers,even
purely sel®sh subjects havea reason to cooperatein the punishment
treatment.
Altruistic punishment and cooperation
Altruistic punishment took place frequently. In the ten sessions,
subjects punished other group members a total of 1,270 times;
84.3% of the subjects punished at least once, 34.3% punished more
than ®ve times during the six periods, and 9.3% punished even
morethantentimes.Punishmentalsofollowedaclearpattern.Most
(74.2%) acts of punishment were imposed on defectors (that is,
below-average contributors) and were executed by cooperators
(that is, above-average contributors), and punishment of the
defectors was harsh (Fig. 1). For example, if a subject invested
© 2002 Macmillan Magazines Ltd14±20MUs less than the average investment of the other group
members during periods 5 and 6, the total group expenditures for
punishing this subject were almost 10MUs. Moreover, the more a
subject's investment fell short of the averageinvestmentof the other
three group members, the more the subject was punished. The
pattern andstrengthofpunishmentwasalso stableacrosstime(Fig.
1).AWilcoxonsignedranktestofpunishmentinperiods1±4versus
periods 5 and 6,with 10matched observations, yields z=-1.07, P =
0.285 (two-tailed). The same test for periods 1±5 versus period 6
yields z = 0.178, P = 0.859 (two-tailed).
We examined how the group expenditures for the punishment of
member i varied with the positive and the negative deviation of
member i's cooperation from the average cooperation of the others.
Our examination is based on Tobit regressions. The regression
coef®cient on `negative deviation' is 0.622 (z = 18.1, P , 0.0005)
and the coef®cient on `positive deviation' is ±0.149 (z = -2.86, P ,
0.004). The hypothesis tests associated with the regression are based
on robust standard errors that take into account that only the
observations across sessions are independent and that punishment
is a censored variable. The average cooperation of other group
members, if added as an explanatory variable to the regression, is
insigni®cant (z = -0.99, P = 0.322). This analysis indicates that an
increase in the negative deviation of i from the others' average
cooperation by 10MUs increased the punishment expenditure of
the others by 6.22MUs (and, hence, the pay-off reduction imposed
oniby18.66MUs),whereasanincreaseinthepositivedeviationofi
by 10MUs reduced the punishment expenditure by 1.49MUs. This
punishment pattern led to a hump-shaped relation between an
individual'sincomeandthedeviationfromtheaveragecooperation
of the other group members. The income was highest when the
individual's investment was close to the average investment of the
others. Both positive and negative deviations from the average
investment decreased an individual's income.
The punishment of non-cooperators substantially increased the
amountthatsubjectsinvestedinthepublicgood.Inthe®vesessions
where the punishment condition was the ®rst treatment (Fig. 2a),
the average cooperation level was much higher in the punishment
condition (Wilcoxon signed rank test, ®ve matched observations,
z = -2.023, P = 0.043, two-tailed). The average investment of
94.2% of the subjects was higher in the punishment condition. In
fact,theaverageinvestmentinthepunishmentconditionwashigher
in each session and in each period than the average investment in
any of the periods and sessions of the no-punishment condition.
Thetimetrendoftheaverageinvestmentwasalsoratherdifferentin
the two conditions (Fig. 2a). Although cooperation increased over
time in the punishment condition, it sharply decreased in the no-
punishment condition. In the ®nal period of the punishment
condition, 38.9% of the subjects contributed their whole endow-
ment and 77.8% contributed 15MUs or more. In the ®nal period of
the no-punishment condition, 58.9% of the subjects contributed
nothing and 75.6% contributed 5MUs or less.
A very similar pattern emerged in the sessions where the no-
punishmentconditioncame®rst(Fig.2b).Theaveragecooperation
again was much higher in the punishment condition (Wilcoxon
signed rank test, ®ve matched observations, z = 2.023, P = 0.043,
two-tailed). In the punishment condition, 91.4% of the subjects
contributed more than in the no-punishment condition. In addi-
tion, although the average investment decreased in the no-punish-
ment condition, it increased sharply in the punishment condition.
Moreover, Fig. 2b indicates that the punishment threat was immed-
iately effective because there was a large upwards jump in invest-
ments when the punishment opportunity was made available to the
subjects.Italsoturnsoutthatthesequenceofthetreatmentshadno
effect on cooperation. Investments in the punishment condition
were similar, irrespective of whether this condition came ®rst or
second in a session (Mann±Whitney test, z = 0.104, d.f. = 4, P =
0.918, two-tailed). The same held for the no-punishment condition
(Mann±Whitney test, z = 1.358, d.f. = 4, P = 0.175, two-tailed).
Thus, we can use the data of all ten sessions to compare the average
investments across conditions so that the differences are signi®cant
at a much higher level (Wilcoxon signed rank test, ten matched
observations, z = 2.803, P = 0.005, two-tailed).
It is not only the punishment opportunity (that is, the non-
executed punishment threat) but also the actual punishment that
raised cooperation levels. When a subject was punished before
period 6, that subject raised investment in the next period on
average by 1.62MUs. Note, however, that this does not constitute
an indirect material bene®t of the act of punishment for an
individual punisher, because the punishing subject never meets
articles



























–20 to –14 –14 to –8 –8 to –2 –2 to 2 2 to 8 8 to 14
Deviation from the mean cooperation



















































Periods 5 and 6
Period 6
Figure 1Meanexpenditureon punishment duringdifferenttimeintervalsasafunctionof
the deviation of the cooperation of the punished group member from the mean
cooperation of the other members. Each money unit (MU) spent on punishment reduced
the income of the punished member by 3MUs. The numbers above the bars indicate the
relative frequency of the observations underlying the bars. For example, during periods
1±4, individual group members deviated between -20 and -14MUs from the average









































































Figure 2 Time trend of mean cooperation together with the 95% con®dence interval.
a, During the ®rst six periods, subjects have the opportunity to punish the other group
members. Afterwards, the punishment opportunity is removed. b, During the ®rst six
periods, punishment of other group members is ruled out. Afterwards, punishment is
possible.
© 2002 Macmillan Magazines Ltdthe same subjects again. The act of punishment does provide a
material bene®t for the future interaction partners of the punished
subject but not for the punisher. Thus, the act of punishment,
although costly for the punisher, provides a bene®t to other
members of the population by inducing potential non-cooperators
to increasetheirinvestments. For thisreason,theact ofpunishment
is an altruistic act.
Emotions as a proximate mechanism
Given the pattern of punishment, the investment behaviour of
subjects seems quite rational. To avoid punishment, subjects
invested in accordance with the group norm. But we wondered
why subjects punish free riders in a one-shot context when this is
costly. With regard to the proximate source of the punishment,
negative emotions may provide an explanation. Free riding may
cause strong negative emotions among the cooperators and these
emotions, in turn, may trigger their willingness to punish the free
riders
24,25. If this conjecture is correct, we should observe particular
emotional patterns in response to free riding. To elicit these
patterns, the participants were confronted with the following two
hypothetical investment scenarios after the ®nal period of the
second treatment (the numbers in brackets relate to the second
scenario):
``You decide to invest 16 [5] francs to the project. The second
group member invests 14 [3] and the third 18 [7] francs. Suppose
the fourth member invests 2 francs to the project. You now
accidentally meet this member. Please indicate your feeling towards
this person.''
After they had read a scenario, subjects had to indicate the
intensity of their anger and annoyance towards the fourth person
(the free rider) on a seven-point scale (1 = `not at all' to 7 = `very
much'). The difference between scenarios 1 and 2 is that the other
three persons in the group contribute relatively much in scenario 1
and relatively little in scenario 2. It turns out that a free rider
triggered much anger among the other subjects if these subjects
contributed a lot relative to the free rider (scenario 1). Forty-seven
percentofthesubjectsindicatedanangerlevelof6or7andanother
37% indicated an anger level of 5. If the deviation of the free rider's
contribution from the other members' contribution was relatively
small (scenario2), the anger levelwas signi®cantly lower (Wilcoxon
signed ranktest,z=9.636,P,0.0005)butstillconsiderable. Inthis
case (scenario 2), 17.4% of the subjects indicated an anger level of 6
or 7 and 80.5% indicated a level of 4 or 5 in scenario 2. This shows
that the intensity of negative emotions towards a free rider varies
with the deviation from the others' average contribution.





[3, 5 and 7] francs to the project. You invest 2 francs to the project
and the others know this. You now accidentally meet one of the
other members. Please indicate the feelings you expect from this
member towards you.''
Inscenarios3and4,thehypotheticalfreeriderhadtoindicatethe
expected anger of the others on a seven-point scale. The anger that
was expected by the free riders in scenario 3 was even greater than
the actually expressed anger according to scenario 1 (Wilcoxon
signed rank test, z = 7.68, P , 0.0005). In scenario 3, 74.5% of the
subjects expected the anger level of others to be 6 or 7, and 22.5%
expected an anger level of 5. In scenario 4, the deviation of the
hypothetical free rider from the others' contribution was smaller
than in scenario 3. This decrease in the deviation from the others
caused signi®cant differences in expected anger levels between
scenarios 3 and 4 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z = 12.17, P ,
0.0005). Only 17.8% of the hypothetical free riders expected anger
levels of 6 or 7 in scenario 4 and 80% expected levels of 4 or 5.
Thelowcontributorsintheno-punishment condition expected a
higher intensity of negative emotions than the high contributors.
This probably re¯ects the fact that the low contributors in the no-
punishment condition experienced more sanctions in the punish-
ment condition.
The same four scenarios were presented to 33 subjects that had
not previously participated in our experiments, to check whether
participating in the experiment affects the elicited emotions. The
same emotional patterns that were expressed by our 240 experi-
mental subjects were expressed by the 33 subjects who did not
participate in our games.
Our results suggest that free riding causes strong negative emo-
tions and that most people expect these emotions. Moreover, the
above emotional pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that
emotions trigger punishment for the following reasons. First, if
negative emotions trigger punishment, most punishment acts
would be expected to be executed by above-average contributors
and imposed on below-average contributors. This is clearly the case
in our experiments: 74.2% of all punishment acts follow this
pattern. Second, punishment increased with the deviation of the
freeriderfromtheaverageinvestmentoftheothermembers. Thisis
exactly what would be expected if negative emotions are the
proximate cause of the punishment, because negative emotions
became more intense as the free rider deviated further from the
others' average investment. Third, if negative emotions cause
punishment, the punishment threat is rendered immediately cred-
ible because most people are well aware that they trigger strong
negative emotions when they free ride. Therefore, we should detect
an immediate impact of the punishment opportunity on contribu-
tions at the switch points between the punishment and the no-
punishment condition. This is what we observed. The introduction
(or elimination) of the punishment opportunity led to an immedi-
ate rise (or fall) in investment (see Fig. 2). Taken together, these
observations are consistent with the view that emotions are an
important proximate factor behind altruistic punishment.
Our evidence has profound implications for the evolutionary
study of human behaviour. In the past, human cooperation has
mainly beenexplainedintermsofkinselection, reciprocalaltruism,
indirect reciprocity and costly signalling. These theories focus
attention on mechanisms other than altruistic punishment. By
showing that altruistic punishment is a key force in the establish-
ment of human cooperation, our study indicates that there is more
at work in sustaining human cooperation than is suggested by these
theories. Thus, our evidence suggests that the evolutionary study of
human cooperation in large groups of unrelated individuals should
include a focus on explaining altruistic punishment
3,26,27. Moreover,
because altruistic punishment occurs among genetically unrelated
individuals and under conditions that rule out direct reciprocity
and reputation formation, the above-mentioned theories do not
readily account for altruistic punishment. M
Methods
A total of 240 undergraduate students (31% females) from the University of Zu Èrich and
the Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) voluntarily participated in the experiments.
Special care was exerted to recruit students from many different disciplines to maximize
the chances that the subjects had never met before. Ten experimental sessions with 24
subjects took place. Each of the 24 subjects played two 6-period public goods games: a
game without a punishment opportunity and a game with a punishment opportunity. In
®ve sessions, subjects ®rst played the punishment treatment and then the no-punishment
treatment; in the other ®ve sessions, the treatment sequence was reversed. When subjects
played the ®rst six-period game, they did not know that another game would take place
after period 6. At the beginning they were informed that the experiment would last for six
periods. After period 6, subjects were told that another six-period experiment would take
placeandthatthereafter the wholesessionwouldbeover. Theexperimentstypicallylasted




one ever met the same person more than once. In every period, the group members knew
nothing about the previous cooperation and punishment decisions of the others in the
articles
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each period, subjects were informed about their own decisions, the decisions of the other
group members, and their monetary pay-off in the current period.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects received written instructions (available
fromthe authors onrequest) that explained to them the pay-offstructure of the game, the
random recomposition of groups across periods, the anonymous identities of the other
session members, the undisclosed history of the previous actions of their current group
members,and the fact that they wouldbe privately paid theirexperimental earningsat the
end of the session. After subjects had read the instructions, but before the start of the
experiment, we determined whether subjects understood the pay-off structure of the
game:subjects had to computetheirown pay-offand the pay-offsoftheir groupmembers
in several hypothetical examples. Every subject solved these exercises correctly. All
experimental decisions were made on a computer screen using the experimental software
z-tree
28. Each of the 24 computers was located in a booth such that subjects could not see
each other. To relate subjects' decisions to their dispositions, subjects ®lled out a
personality questionnaire before and after the experiment. In addition, subjects ®lled out
an emotions questionnaire after the experiment.
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